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William James’s Philosophical Impact  
 Originally published in French in 1997 and finally translated into English, David 
Lapoujade's William James: Empiricism and Pragmatism (2019) is varnished by the 
specter of Deleuzean transcendental empiricism. Despite Lapoujade – perhaps the single 
greatest living French Deleuze scholar – rarely references Deleuze directly in this book, 
he culls James’s pragmatistic theory of truth by way of a relational ontology of referential 
becoming by simultaneously tracking in Deleuzean parlance. From the connective 
synthesis to the disjunctive synthesis, Lapoujade references key facets of Deleuze’s 
tripartite synthesis of time, bridging these concepts with how, in James’s system, 
continuities function as givens and empiricism, by way of stream of consciousness, 
weaves co-penetrations with continuous flows. In turn, William James is as much an 
archeological disinterring of Deleuze by way of James as it is a recovery of James’s 
pragmatism from Richard Rorty’s neo-pragmatism – an attempt to supersede Rorty’s 
sprawling overhang and commanding philosophical shadow. As Lapoujade markedly 
articulates in the first few pages of his book, he understands Rorty's neo-pragmatism – 
and, more specifically, Rorty's notion of “conversation” – as incorrectly reducing James's 
conception of “convention” to “consensus”. This galvanises the political vim of Lapoujade’s 
project, as he seeks to reveal that the overdetermination of “consensus,” delineated 
within Rorty’s conception of “liberal democracy” – and Rorty’s long-term Deweyan pursuit 
of discovering a moral center vis-à-vis context-dependent truth claims in language-use 
by way of mutual recognition – elides James’s theoretical and conceptual pluralism, 
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reducing James’s “nomadic” thought into a univocal monolith. Indeed, Rorty’s interests 
lied in the indissoluble interwovenness of experience with language, as well in the 
possibilities and limits of language – Rorty undertook this endeavor by instrumentalising 
Jamesian pragmatism to tease out contingency in our language-claims while parrying 
with James’s idealised claim of linguistic coherence in regards to supporting truth 
claims. Contra Rorty, Lapoujade’s enterprise is thoroughly Deleuzean; Lapoujade surveys 
James’s literature to excavate how what really exists is not things as they are made a 
posteriori but things in the making, i.e., reality considered in the moment of its creating. 
While Lapoujade’s critique of Rorty bookends the project, the plexus of the text is 
comprised of delineating James’s pluralism qua pragmatism as a philosophy of localised 
transcendence. Consider, for instance, James’s apothegm: "[t]o understand a thing rightly 
we need to see it both out of its environment and in it, and to have acquaintance with the 
whole range of its variations" (James, 1982 [1902]: 23); readers may recognise this 
statement as homologous to Deleuze’s machine ontology. This is no coincidence, as 
James’s “radical empiricism” had an inestimable influence on Deleuze. However, since 
Lapoujade frequently utilises Deleuzean verbiage without directly citing Deleuze, it will 
highly benefit readers to prime themselves on a few central concepts colouring Deleuze’s 
thought. Particularly, in his early account of “transcendental empiricism” Deleuze’s 
materialist transvaluation of the Kantian account of transcendental subjectivity imparts 
how impersonal, inhuman thinking does not merely represent the natural world but is 
directly productive of forms (e.g., space and time; Deleuze, 1994 [1968]). In his more 
mature work, Deleuze accounts for a supplementary account of subjectification, wherein 
an appeal to the “encounter” ensures the “measure of fit” between transcendental 
empiricism as a constructivist mathematism of concepts and the world of intensive, 
actual difference. Here, to define an entity is to observe it alongside what it does, 
registering it in the act of translation, a functional appeal – all that exists is actants and 
their associations, without a priori suppositions. The Deleuzean subject emerges as part 
of the natural world while nonetheless functioning as a catalyst for morphogenesis. 
Deleuze’s pluralist transcendental empiricism is opposed to Kant’s transcendental 
philosophy; where Kantian transcendental subjectivity foregoes the possibility of 
conceiving of different and differential relations, and interactions between entities 
themselves, Deleuze’s “transcendental empiricism” designates how indirect 
approximations are the only way by which we come to terms with the “inner beings” of 
machines. 
Perhaps the most critical bricolage for between Deleuze and James is by way of 
James’s two orders of logical inquiry, comprised of i) existential judgment, or "thatness" 
(a proposition about something, which inquires "what is the nature of it?"), and ii) spiritual 
judgment, or "whatness" (proposition of value). According to James, "[n]either judgment 
can be deduced immediately from the other. They proceed from diverse intellectual 
preoccupations, and the mind combines them only by making them first separately, and 
then adding them together" (James, 1982 [1902]: 9). With the twofold relation becoming a 
threefold, James introduces a disjunctive relation. Here James situates a critique of 
Kant's three syntheses – for James what is qualifies as psychic reality is not inferior to 
Kant’s higher forms of knowledge. This critique and the disjunctive relation will also 
reappear in Deleuze’s critique of Kant’s syntheses.  
Readers familiar with Difference and Repetition will immediately remember 
Deleuze's portraiture of non-chronological time where Deleuze uses Bergson's inverted 
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cone to model the dynamic representation of regressive memory. Like James, Deleuze is 
working within a Kantian-Bergsonian hybrid register: contraction is the first synthesis 
(the present, habit); retention is the second synthesis (the past, the ground of memory); 
expectation is the third synthesis (the future, the death drive, or “need”). For Deleuze, the 
difference between foundation and ground is the difference between the present as the 
most contracted point of experience and the past as the totality of time implied in the 
present as a continuity between past and present. Expectation allots how something 
tends towards overcoming its own limit (Deleuze, 1994: 73-74). Like James, Deleuze 
recalls Kant's three syntheses of: i) apprehension (the synthesis or "synopsis" of the 
present); ii) memory (recollection “of the thought object and its recognition by a thinking 
subject” in the sense of the capacity to reproduce, i.e., the synthesis of reproduction); iii) 
final recognition (knowledge, or the capacity to subordinate memory under concepts). For 
Deleuze to combat Kantian understanding he distinguishes how, after memory, one does 
not encounter judgment and recognition but, instead, encounters something that breaks 
from representation, moving towards the production of the future—that is, “the process of 
prediction” (Deleuze 1994: 226).1 
In Anti-Oedipus (1983 [1972]), we see the disjunctive synthesis coming into its full 
form,2 prodding forth material affect(s) and implying a counter-actualisation, a 
“becoming” of that which it was previously not.3 In such later work, the logic of Deleuze’s 
disjunctive synthesis is demarcated within the machine ontology as the second synthesis, 
following the contractive (first) synthesis of connecting relations and followed by the 
conjunctive (third) synthesis, which creates externality and residual relations of novelty. 
According to Deleuze’s disjunctive synthesis, entities are endowed with a gradient or 
register of “receptivity” upon which traces of encounters (regarding internal matters of 
alteration) record themselves, resulting in the “change that is substance itself” (Deleuze, 
1990 [1988]: 36).   
In James’s system, relations are sometimes connective, sometimes disjunctive 
and always external to their terms. Like Deleuze’s conjunctive synthesis, which repeats 
the logic of the connective synthesis but also implies rupture and contiguity through 
forces of habit, connection, and contraction, for James it is “continuity, the great 
continuous plane of pure experience” that prevents the movement of relations from being 
imprisoned within preexisting forms or preexisting relations (Lapoujade 2019: 36). That is, 
“pure experience” ushers novelty and new relations. For James relations are perceived at 
the same time as the terms they link; James’s radical empiricism rejects any element(s) 
we do not directly experience – furthermore, we experience terms as disjunctive and 
equally well experience their connections. Thus, “likeness” or similarity is perceived at 
the same time as a second term's difference. Notably, however, Deleuze’s elaboration of 
transcendental empiricism as capable of explaining the genesis of thought’s 
determinations – that is, the real rather than the a priori conditions of knowledge – as 
predicated upon the philosophy of mathematics, with particularly close regard to the 
distribution of singularities along a manifold, drawing from Albert Lautman’s conception 
of manifolds qua determined objects. James’s empiricism, on the other hand, is 
preoccupied with how perception and the act of belief facilitate “pure experience” which 
is (like the Deleuzean virtual) neither reducible to pure sensory matter4 nor constituted 
by forms of pure subjectivity.  
Lapoujade stakes the claim that pragmatism is an instrumentalism for judging an 
idea, doctrine, or statement not as a function of truth but, in surpassing epistemological 
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value, pragmatism allots judgment by way of consequences for thought, action, or belief. 
Following Lapoujade, this marks the nexus of James’s pragmatism, which promotes a 
definition of truth as a method for experimentation, a method for constructing novel 
truths:  
A true idea, in the pragmatic sense, is an idea that changes something in the 
mind of the person thinking, in a satisfactory manner. The true idea is not 
only what we believe, what we do, or what we think; it is what makes us 
believe, makes us act, or makes us think. At the same time, then, 
pragmatism is a method for evaluating truth. (Lapoujade, 2019: 35). 
For James, pure experience is the universal, a nonqualified and neutral field prior 
to psychology or experience. This corresponds to the existence of an external and 
objective world independent of us, external to our perception, and which precedes the 
experience(s) we have of it. Thus, an event can be considered in isolation, where it is a 
matter of “pure experience,” or the event can be integrated into a series, where it 
changes in nature and takes on meaning, becoming a “what” and gaining signification. 
This happens vis-à-vis interpretation (18). Having adequately mapped the Deleuzean 
latticework that Lapoujade is tacitly working in, let us now move on to detail other central 
concepts that Lapoujade illuminates within James’s literature. 
 
James’s Philosophy of Discrete Multiplicities 
 Drawing and amending the traditional British empiricism of Locke, Hume, and 
Berkley, James’s empiricism involves the construction of a plane that allows for 
observing how excesses, beliefs, and judgments are made. Again, experience is based on 
fundamental pure experience – a first moment of inexperience (i.e., a blank state); James, 
clearly indebted to classical empiricism, sees this plane as inextricable from the question 
of inference. James’s radical empiricism allows us to begin with a plane of nothing 
preestablished. No certainty or form of knowledge has yet appeared, and all has the right 
to be constructed 
 Distinguishing it from C.S. Peirce and John Dewey, Lapoujade elaborates what, 
exactly, “the practical” means for James’s pragmatism: the point of view where reality, 
thought, knowledge, and action are considered in terms of their making. What does this 
mean for the idea, then? For James, opposing rationalists and absolutists (esp. 
Hegelians), it is not sufficient to say the idea is thought within the mind or that the mind 
represents idea, for this deprives movement; for James, philosophy must demonstrate 
how the idea is made in the mind and how the mind is made by it by way of practical 
consequences. James’s pragmatic criteria is as follows: the idea is not a representation, 
a reflective act, or the modification of the mind but a process by which the mind is made. 
A similar concept can be found in James’s psychological treatises such as The Principles 
of Psychology (1890), where consciousness is understood as the movement of what is 
being made conscious – consciousness contracts away from and expands with the 
unconscious bordering it. 
 In his 1904 treatise, Essays in Radical Empiricism, James inaugurates "radical 
empiricism,” dealing with the notion of pure experience by showing how a plane of 
thought exists which precedes categories of psychology and traditional philosophy. For 
James, these categories are constituted on the basis of this plane of thought, rather than 
constituting thought. James opposes binary oppositions such as subject/object or 
matter/thought, which are not given as a priori forms but are processes made within and 
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alongside thought. Enumerating the scope of his project, Lapoujade details three 
problems that his review of James' work seeks to resolve: 
1) pragmatism, "whose problem consists of determining which signs or ideas lead to our 
being able to act or to augment our power to act" (7-8).5 
2) radical empiricism, "whose problem consists of determining how signs are constituted 
and the rules according to which they are organized" (8). 
3) psychology, "whose problem consists of determining what allows consciousness to 
give meaning to the signs it perceives and how consciousness responds to them through 
variations in its flow" (8). 
 James' ambition is to seize reality in the moment of its making by way of a plane of 
construction, so he cannot adopt psychology or transcendentalism. As a consequence, 
James must formulate pure experience as neither irreducible to pure sensory matter nor 
constituted by forms of pure subjectivity. Thus, "[w]hat must be explored are the 
movements that are located beneath the forms of psychology or inherited from them" 
(12). Lapoujade traces back relations given in a pure state where they are not yet divided 
into categorical binaries (e.g., subject/object, matter/spirit, etc.). 
 Bergson, a contemporary of James’s thought (and a linkage evidencing Lapoujade’s 
bricolage between James and Deleuze), conceived of the image as defined vide matter 
and movement, wherefore everything is image. This influenced James’s notion of pure 
experience as being conscious qua perception (i.e., consciousness vis-à-vis what we are 
conscious of). In turn, James, like Bergson, runs up against the question of how can there 
be a pure experience or an image in itself? James and Bergson contest the implicit 
assumption of the subject as primary and, for James, it is the neutral character of 
experience where everything remains indefinite; material cannot be qualified as 
objective, subjective, matter, or mind. This field of indivisible events becomes a necessary 
point of departure, such that "[p]ure experience is experience from the point of view of 
the event" (16). Lapoujade argues that the immediate flow of life is asserted as the 
immanent condition for all experience and, therefore, empiricism rediscovers the 
transcendental. James denies the immediate certainty of thought; the field of pure 
experience is deployed for itself. The empirical and the transcendental are equipollent, 
jointed in an identity relation of equivalency.  
 As a consequence of reality's being exterior and immanent to us, we need not 
submit to its principle – the subject is an interpretation of corporeal affections; for 
James, this means that we have to make reality and put it into signs. This is the role of 
perception and of belief: interpreting as real and signifying as real, the sign is at once 
both a sign of exteriority and of how events become real – Lapoujade terms this a 
"shock" (21). These “shocks” also create preperceptions, allowing for the accordance of 
knowledge-constitution such that there is an interpretation, belief, or ego that comes first 
but, consequently, an intensity that unwinds, making us believe. James's 
psychophysiological postulate underscores interpretation’s apperceptive situatedness, as 
with any mental flow where what comes first is emotion, which is inseparable from 
bodily affection and which determines interpretation:  
I can not help that … I, too, have my intuitions and I must obey them. Let the 
case be what it may in others, I am as confident as I am of anything that, in 
myself, the stream of thinking (which I recognise emphatically as a 
phenomenon) is only a careless name for what, when scrutinised, reveals 
itself to consist chiefly of the stream of my breathing. The ‘I think’ which Kant 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 






said must be able to accompany all my objects, is the ‘I breathe’ which actually 
does accompany them (James, 2010 [1904]: 58). 
 The reader may, at this point, have formed a bricolage between James’s radical 
empiricism of pure experience and Gilbert Simondon’s notion of the neutral field. Thomas 
Lamarre’s “Afterward” pays a great deal of attention to elaborating this similarity by 
linking the two thinkers’ theory of formation and reading James as an early thinker of 
networked relations. Another important philosophical project bridges James and 
Simondon: their mutual rejection of Aristotelian hylomorphism.  
 Simondon begins from matter rather than a priori forms, as forms emerge through 
a difference of matter by which matter is crossed, like a (quantum/differential) field, by a 
difference of potential. This is also analogous with empirical observations – Simondon 
thus remarks that, if “to perceive consists in increasing the information of the system 
formed by the subject and the field in which it is oriented, the conditions of perception are 
analogous to those of every stable structuration: a metastable state must precede 
perception” (2020: 269). This “objective field,” which Simondon often makes reference to 
and describes as a primitive, neutral, and “magical” stage is the arena upon which man 
and mediation find themselves fundamentally structured through circuits of exchange 
qua being – that is, “[m]an finds himself linked to a universe experienced as a milieu” 
(Simondon, 2017: 177). Unlike James, however, for Simondon, the objectivation of 
mediation has a correlative in the subjectivation of mediation, which is object-ified and 
objectivised by way of the technical object that tethers man and the world to one another. 
Nonetheless, like James’s “pure experience,” Simondon’s field of reference, what he calls 
a “magical stage,” precedes mediation and, thus, precedes subjectivisation, belief, or 
objectivisation: it “is only the simplest and most fundamental of structurations of the 
milieu of a living being: the birth of a network of privileged points of exchange between 
the being and the milieu” (177).6 Likewise, in James’s pragmatic method ideas via function 
not form. 
 
James and Absolutism: Saltatory and Ambulatory Knowledge Qua Convention 
 For Hegel, the phenomenological propaedeutic, rising to the ideal of a 
“presuppositionless science” determines that even appeals to sensory immediacy as the 
ground of experience are always already mediated by the concept. As a philosophical 
doctrine, rationalism postulates that philosophy must begin by securing the scope of 
what thought is capable of thinking before it can adequately give an itinerary of what 
there happens to be (even if what there happens to be is, in the last instance, to be 
identified with thinking itself, as is the case for idealists). Conversely, we call “Empiricist” 
any position according to which knowledge about the structure of being or becoming 
implies an investigation of what is given to sensory experience, of which “thinking being” 
is but one thing to explain among others. The examples of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume 
remain paradigmatic: being is disclosed non-inferentially to thought in sensory intuition, 
in relation to which theoretical speculation and inferential knowledge is considered 
derivative. 
 For James, it is not individuals that come first but the signs that they exchange. 
Relation has ontological priority over the individual, which is necessarily and directly 
social; relation and the relational are ontologically primary. Reality is constructed by 
interpretations, with such interpretations guaranteeing truth. For James satisfaction 
results from the relation between belief and truth; James does not veer towards not 
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relativism ("everything is relative") but evinces that truth is inseparable from the point of 
view stating it. A statement has meaning only under certain conditions. James’s position 
is far closer to perspectivism, which is not relativist but refers to the function of 
interpretation. Taking relations as the point of departure, James not only spars with 
Aristotle but battles against the monism of the One and All of absolutists and Hegelians – 
who, according to Lapoujade, begin with pluralism but end with Monism through 
implication. For James, Rationalism (or what he calls “vicious abstractionism”) ignores 
that an idea is a part of the flow of consciousness. Lapoujade paints a picture of 
pragmatism as rejecting eternal truths and critiquing representation first and foremost 
because ideas are not reproductions but, instead, are actions/transitions/creations. It 
follows, in turn, that truth can depend on practical consequences only when they belong 
intrinsically to the idea: truth is a process and "[r]esemblance obviously does not allow 
us to determine the truth of a new idea since by definition truth does not resemble 
anything" (Lapoujade, 2019: 33). What is true is, in turn, true by concrete 
consequences/practice (the pragmatic rule par excellence) rather than ideas (which, for 
Rationalism, are true in themselves). Lapoujade, in his close study of James, designates 
pragmatism as an instrumentalism for evaluating truth.  
 Lapoujade distills that, for James, reality is formed of an incalculable number of 
networks superposed upon one another, forming a vast reticular ensemble.7 Given 
James’s plurality of linear connections, and contra the grand unified system of the 
Hegelian dialectic, there are systems everywhere:  
The result is innumerable little hangings-together of the world's parts within 
the larger hangings-together, little worlds, not only of discourse but of 
operation, within the wider universe. Each system exemplifies one type or 
grade of union, its parts being strung on that peculiar kind of relation, and the 
same part may figure in many different systems, as a man may hold various 
offices and belong to several clubs. (James, [2018] 1907:  52) 
 Having made the case for James as a thinker of multiplicities, Lapoujade details that 
knowledge, for James, is a set of connections and that it requires a “leap” on the part of 
the subject to create new bridges. James posits a condition exterior to the relation that 
makes it (that is, the relation) possible – this allows Lapoujade, defending James as a 
thinker of “convention” (instead of consensus) qua relative/provisional series, to identity 
the departure towards knowledge with the “subject” and the arrival, or a term’s entry into 
a new intermediary series, with the “object” (45). James’s philosophy begins with the 
subject or consciousness and a “leap” of transcendence is then required for the subject 
to attain the object. It follows that, as a first step, forms act as principles and empirical 
matter fills the chasm of epistemology, positing the foundation of any relation – as with 
the notion of truth –with anterior and essential content. This exterior immanent condition 
and the “leap” of transcendence makes possible “a transcendental subject, an absolute 
mind” (43). Furthermore, this condition of immanence, like the relation (and to the same 
degree as the relation) is exterior to knowledge. Following James, conditions are, at 
once, brought down into the subject while a degree of immanence is recovered.  
 For James, truth cannot be defined apart from the terminating places to which it 
leads, i.e., its guidings –"[t]he word truth means just such leadings and guidings" (James, 
1907: 290). For James truth is not a matter of mere recognition or discovery; James 
resists attributing preference to "blood is red because it looks so" over "blood looks so 
because it's red" or vice versa (290). For James, both are equally correct and it is the 
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leading that makes us call the idea true, proving that we have called it so justly. By way 
of pragmatism's practical meaning, truth denotes certain ideas and connotes their 
“getting there.” Accordingly, concrete facts denoted by the word “truth” are ideas that 
guide us towards certain termini; to be and to guide are equipollent terms. There is no 
substantive connotation in the word “truth” that is over and above such guiding 
processes; agreement, correspondence, and thinking the object as it is all resolve 
themselves into “guides,” into "getting there." 
 James does not solve the problem of passage to knowledge by way of the Absolute, 
as was the choice method of Kant’s successors for whom relations are interior to an 
infinitely comprehensive Spirit. For James, it is the procedural task of knowledge to move 
beyond dualisms but not by transcending them by simply linking two absolutely 
independent terms within a common superior form. James deems this type of knowledge 
“saltatory knowledge.” James seeks to formulate an alternative understanding of belief – 
one that identifies “convention” with form-object unity, where the object is a complex of 
relations that is prolonged, instead of cleavaged. For James, an act of belief is a 
construction, not a “leap.” Belief builds a footbridge with relations, retaining their 
continuity – relations are not interior to their terms but homogenous with them, such that 
they carry over their roots or virtual content to a new milieu (44). James thus invokes a 
new type of knowledge that is not “saltatory” but “ambulatory,” with ambulation as such 
leading to provisional terms driven through intervening experiences. As a consequence, 
those intermediaries determining what particular knowing-function is exerted. Recalling 
Deleuze, one may say that difference without repetition is “saltatory” whereas difference 
with repetition or, difference as a bridge of intermediaries, is “ambulatory.”8 
 Ambulatory knowledge deals with intermediaries as they determine particular 
knowing, with the intervening experience(s) proffering concrete relation(s) of cognition. 
For James “knowing” is quite literally made via ambulation, as intervening experiences 
and intermediate experiences get related to a particular object. These intermediaries 
determine what particular knowing-function the object exerts, giving the object meaning 
vis-à-vis what it communicates, what it carries over. As it relates to mentality, James 
here erects a rather rigorous theory of functionalism to understand mental states. For 
James whenever we take it concretely, cognising means determinate “ambulation,” a 
process that unravels through intermediaries, “from a terminus a quo to, or towards, a 
terminus ad quem” (James, 1987 [1909]: 899). Such is James’s continuist hypothesis of 
pure experience, bricolaging epistemological chasms instead of replacing preexisting 
forms with empirical matter. James organises material in a functional series, such that 
the process of knowledge draws on vast network of connections. It follows that concepts, 
as condensed experience, are intermediary series within this network—the concept is in 
effect a conglomerate of virtual perceptions and, "[a]s with Bergson, perceptions and 
concepts are prehensions: they hold together the terms of some multiplicity or another; 
this is what allows them to serve as maps" (Lapoujade, 2019: 46).  
 Contra the theoretical finality of Rationalism and Absolutism, both of which posit 
that knowledge has an end in itself, James’s pragmatism is a method for what is in the 
making. This is why Lapoujade refers to it as a “nomadic” epistemology. Unchaining 
philosophy from theoretical finality, James frees material from its forms, relations from 
inherence, events from attribution, truth from resemblance, movement from immutability, 
the ambulatory from the foundation, multiplicities from unity, the idea from 
representation – freeing "to render it [philosophy] copresent with its creative practice" 
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(48). In short, for James theory and practice are not two distinct activities such that one 
is exercised in the speculative, scientific domain and the other in the technical, utilitarian 
domain. Instead, first comes action and then the theoretical, with the practical coeval to 
action; knowledge guides or orients our activity but does not constitute it. 
 Finally, we have arrived at “convention,” Lapoujade’s mooring. According to 
Lapoujade, James’s conception of “convention” cannot be separated from faith, which is a 
two-step process: the first moment is of assessment, the evaluation of a situation; the 
second moment involves throwing oneself into action, acting on the idea and making an 
agreement with the idea in order to act on it. This agreement entails "faith," proper. In this 
description of “convention” by means of “faith,” James recalls the example of the 
oarsmen that Hume famously illustrated in both A Treatise of Human Nature (1739) and 
An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals (1751).  
 For Hume, the concept of convention is part of an inner sense of duty and 
articulated via occasions when we are willing to act by way of such duty despite there is 
no prior natural motive. Ultimately, these are cases of justice for Hume, where there is 
no natural inclination to explain willingness. Justice, as such, is not a natural virtue but 
artificial, a condition that we acquire because of the influence on us of social institutions 
and adopt through implicit recognition of common interests. Hume uses the analogy of 
two oarsmen who row together without any explicit mutual undertaking to do so—despite 
the duo of oarsmen row in unison, there is no reason for us to presume that they seek a 
common end. Each may have their own unique aim but, nonetheless, this aim can solely 
be achieved by way of understanding that the other will behave in a certain way: the boat 
will veer sharply and rotate to one side if one of the oarsmen rows and the other does 
not, or if one rows more vigorously than the other. The coordinated endeavor of both 
oarsmen presupposes that each understand and recognise intentional activity. In turn, 
Hume’s conception of “convention” as the general sense of common interest necessitates 
adherence to a pattern of behavior alongside knowledge of, or belief in, an other’s 
performance, producing a standard of behavior that must be conformed to for any person 
to derive the benefit that the “convention” confers. 
 James builds upon this idea of “convention” as an agreement without guarantee: 
"[t]he particular moment when we place our faith in a series of uncertain signs may be 
called a convention; convention is defined as a tacit agreement with an idea that is 
indeterminate (at least with respect to its consequences) in accordance to which we 
venture into action with a sense of faith" (Lapoujade, 2019: 56). Signs are not over and 
above us as ideal causes that abolish the distance between those who serve them but 
are between us and in a relation of immanence. The “indeterminate” here also 
corresponds to the indefinite and this is particularly the case with religion, which appeals 
to the indetermination (i.e., the force of the margin) in our power to act rather than to a 
determinate entity. While James demonstrates that religious belief rests on indefinite 
experience rather than a definite experience, it is more generally due to the character of 
his plurality that there is a reserve of nonconscious potentiality that embeds 
indeterminacy into the system. Plurality as such characterises any subject's apparent 
lack of control over their actions or their failure to know why something has been done, 
is the case, or is happening. Indeterminacy implies that which is not reducible to form; in 
short, "[v]ariation is immanent" (102-103).  
 James's transcendental field, as a plane of immanence, allows a move away from 
forms and structures towards flows, functions, phases, and fields. For James, there is a 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 






"transmarginal region" that "contains every kind of matter." (James, 1987 [1902]: 338). This 
implies a plurality of connections in which any organism is ecologically entangled. Just 
as Deleuze and Guattari's desiring-machine works by breaking down, James's notion of 
inner variation allows for genuine exteriority and inner diversity, aberration and ill-
adaptation, which is not to be overcome rationally/dialectically (as is the case for 
Rationalism's dealing with theodicy). James tracks contingent impurity and the material 
flows organised around it by way of energetic systems; this is readily the case when 
James deals with and tracks socially and psychically marginal experiences. This is 
particularly prudent with religious experience, which James sees as opening the question 
of the absolute and putting it into relational becoming, "inwardising" religious experience, 
dealing with selection and transformation vide immanent variation. Similarly, James's 
engagement with the natural sciences is to evince referential methodologies qua 
groundless ground/prepositive ground. Rather than conceiving of contradiction in terms 
of rational or dialectical movement in relation to a Grand Absolute or a transcendent 
point of view, James prods us to think dynamically about contradiction, in terms of 
transversal movement and by relation to an absolute vis-à-vis a neutral point (Lamarre 
sees James's approach here as confluent with Foucault's genealogical contingency; 113).9  
 If convention is a force of law, a category, then what is the role of a specific choice 
among possible conventions? Lapoujade remarks that our choice is guided by 
experimental facts. Necessity is not seen as an intrinsic property of the idea or of 
reasoning but rooted in the motivations that produce resemblance/agreement. The 
solutions or rules are immanent in each case and do not dependent on values 
transcending existences. Thus “[i]t is not possible to set up any universal rule" (58), 
because we always need to update and amend our choices. Any agreement is momentary 
and does not last beyond resolution of a particular crisis⁠—the impossibility of 
determining a convention in advance and convention's situational specificity 
demonstrates how pragmatism is a "method of practical evaluation of conventions" (59). 
For Lapoujade, pragmatism thus rejects the distinction between theoretical activity and 
practical activity⁠ – every concept harbors practical interest as it refers to different 
possible circumstances for acting and thinking. This is related to cohesiveness, which 
depends on faith that is distributed within the community10 – for Lapoujade convention 
must displace “the contract” and its Rousseauian atomist postulate where the multiple is 
absorbed into the collective One-All as we pass from the individual to society. According 
to Lapoujade, James’s world has meaning not by way of mutual submission to general 
law but by way of implicit accord, and convention allots for such an infrapersonal and 
interindividual rule of interpretation that is established by way of exchanging signs. For 
Lapoujade, as Dewey says, the individual is an immediately social reality (i.e, society is 
principal) and one does not “believe in signs without believing that others also believe in 
them as well. I believe in a belief” (69).11 Threading James’s understanding of convention, 
we see how the rule of interpretation is nested within convention and established by 
exchanging signs. Thus, “the real” is a set of objects and relations of a social nature. 
 
Conclusion: Lapoujade vis-à-vis Rorty: Language and Ethnocentrism 
 Lapoujade concludes his project by, once again, return to the neo-pragmatist 
rendering of Rorty, who he sees as endowing James and pragmatism with an explicitly 
American criteria of universal democracy, expropriating the United States as an 
CONTINENTAL THOUGHT & THEORY: A JOURNAL OF INTELLECTUAL FREEDOM 






indigenous source of fundamental values. For Lapoujade, Rorty misrepresents James by 
reducing his pluralist thought into a univocal monolith. By elucidating “convention,” 
Lapoujade shows how James' pragmatist theory of truth does not come down to 
validation through action and is not simply a "theory of action," even if James maintains 
that the truth of the idea (epistemological perspective) lies partly in its practical 
consequences. It is, instead, a theory of belief qua relationality. 
 Lapoujade’s critique of Rorty is that reducing convention to consensus "entails the 
production of statements within an ultimately predefined framework" (74). For Lapoujade, 
Rorty elides any trace of convention here and this leads not to the nature of the concept 
and its logical or practical liaisons but to intersubjective/communicational agreement, 
thereby neglecting any increase in the power of our theoretical or practical activity and 
common interests. According to Lapoujade, Rorty's project promotes mutual recognition 
among representatives of the same community of thought, risking a philosophy of 
economic or political opportunism that foments ethnocentrism in the last instance. 
Lapoujade's project seeks to save James from the exportation of liberal values through 
communication, illuminating pragmatism as a presentation of salvation or loss where 
faith is a vital matter.  
 However, Rorty’s engagement with ethnocentrism is not laudatory and this is a 
distortion of Rorty’s critique. As William Gavin, Stefan Neubert, and Kersten Reich 
remark, for Rorty:  
…the task of philosophy is to provide arguments to keep the conversation about 
values of civilisation going. Any such talk, for him, has a necessarily 
ethnocentric dimension to it. It is always relative to contexts of history, culture, 
and language. However, there remains the distinction between good and bad 
argument in any given discourse even if we cannot claim a last or superior 
observer position from which to fully evaluate different discourses against 
each other (2010: 117). 
 For Rorty, ethnocentrism is unavoidable and perhaps the very operation of his 
philosophy is a framing operation that seeks to criticise it by way of demonstration – this 
would mean that, perhaps, Lapoujade is a bit unfair to Rorty. Rorty’s fact-constructivism 
and its relativistic purview sees truths as relative to a theory, language-game, or a way 
of talking (this is also why Rorty was rather keen on Derrida's critique of logocentrism). 
In turn, since facts are only facts insofar as they are relative to our language/way of 
talking, they are shaped by our contingent activities, needs, and interests. That is, for 
Rorty no fact is independent of our descriptions; given his understanding of humans as 
linguistic beings in regards to truth, pure experiences can never be pure in the sense of 
unmediated by language. Therefore, Rorty stresses the unavoidable ethnocentrism 
involved in all truth-games, as language is always fraught with cultural contexts. 
Particularly in texts like Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (1989) Rorty stresses that we 
should substitute the traditional philosophical mission for uncovering universal consent 
with this contingency when working with like-minded world-makers vide mutually 
shared language games. This is, in fact, not the trumpeted cry of imperialist spirit and the 
American enterprise but quite the opposite: Rorty’s admission is that, following 
Wittgenstein, language can be understood as a practice of like-minded world-makers 
that produce viable truth claims.  
 In turn, what obtains for one cultural practice is not ethical to transpose to another 
cosmogony. Rorty thus tempers linguistic solidarity’s universalistic orientations, 
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accepting that the linguistic constructions of other groups or communities other than 
one’s own may be “equally real” or commensurate in truth, as there is no meta-
perspective that provides us with a semiological commensurable framework. This is not 
a denial of virtual unity and the power of belief (i.e., convention) nor does it attempt to 
purpose a “new model of conversation whose singular merit is to clearly reveal its 
disturbing ambition to achieve consensus” (Lapoujade: 74). Such “consensus” is precisely 
what Rorty opposes and this intervention has had lasting metaphysical propriety in those 
influenced by Rorty. Consider, for instance, how Robert Brandom imports Rorty's 
suspicion to the realm of propositional attitudes and conceptual competence, performing 
an alchemic admixture of Hegel with pragmatism. Brandom gives us a rather rich 
understanding of language not as a formal structure but as a feature of the natural 
history of sapient beings, characterising the meanings that get conferred on expressions 
by their roles in discursive practices. As Brandom argues, although to describe and 
explain the world in the material mode supposes in general the capacity to make and 
endorse patterns of inference in the formal mode, it does not follow that such 
descriptions and explanations are about inferential licenses. For the latter is only made 
available through a metalinguistic apparatus capable of making explicit the infrastructure 
of normative-discursive practice which guides description and explanation of the world 
and its alethic modal structure. 
 Lapoujade remarks that Rorty’s pragmatism is American, consumerist, (neo)liberal. 
This charge is a crude misrepresentation of Rorty’s project and readers will be thankful 
that such a slapdash exegesis, besmirching an otherwise entirely erudite project, only 
occupies a sparse few pages of this book. Let us quote, as Brandom explains, the scope 
of Rorty’s neo-pragmatism:  
If you ask a contemporary German philosopher about pragmatism, he or she 
will describe it as a reductive, psychologistic theory that seeks to understand 
normativity in terms of the grasping selfishness of a bourgeois shopkeeper, 
whose answer to every question is, “Well, what’s in it for me? How can I get 
some advantage from this?” It is a reductively utilitarian answer to theoretical 
and epistemological questions in line with the practical philosophy of Bentham 
and Mill. But there is another way to see it, the way Rorty saw it, as announcing 
nothing less than a second Enlightenment. The first Enlightenment had the idea 
of human beings, in their practical conduct, as under the sway of some 
nonhuman authority, as though the norms that ought to govern our 
interactions with each other could be read metaphysically off the world. That is 
opposed to a view that it’s up to us to discern moral norms, to decide how we 
want to behave and ought to behave. That, in Rorty’s vision of pragmatism, 
freed us from the idea that in our account of how things are, we’re subject to 
norms that are somehow written into the way the world is, as opposed to 
thinking of our cognitive activities as social undertakings where standards of 
evidence are to be discovered and determined by the inquirers (Brandom, 2013: 
379). 
 As Brandom makes clear, Rorty’s ethnocentric exhumation is a critique of 
normativity and how it operates, not a prescription of consensus; it is, if anything, a 
humble project lighting a candle to mankind’s intellectual restraints and limits. As a last 
word, the tension between Rorty and Lapoujade may relate to what the former is trying to 
do with James specifically, which is entirely distinct from Lapoujade’s machine-
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ontological pluralism. For Rorty, James was unfortunately both a pragmatist and a 
radical empiricist, unfortunate because for James his empiricism led him to the 
conception of religious experience not only as intimate phenomena but also a way to deal 
“with realities in the completest sense of the term” (James, [1902]: 446). When James 
conceives of private or personal phenomena, he sees them as real because they are 
given in immediate unconceptualised experience. This is not simply the domain of the 
social but the domain of phenomenology by way of the in-itself. James here echoes the 
Bergsonian position concerning a world of pure experience. However, for Rorty this is an 
adumbrate view and a chimera, lapsing into the Myth of the Given. While Rorty endorses 
James’s functionalism qua truth by way of human activities, following Sellars’s and 
Wittgenstein’s view, for Rorty “there is no such thing as the intrinsic content of an 
experience. To report an experience is simply to respond to being in a certain brain state 
with whatever sentences one’s linguistic community has programmed one to use in that 
situation. If this view is right, then a change from a religious to a nonreligious outlook, or 
vice versa, can never be a matter of drawing information from the content of a new 
experience” (Rorty, 2004: 29). Lapoujade’s extension of virtualities in making faith a 
recipe comprised of ingredients that, themselves, are the vital matter of a social nature, 
arguably lapses into such Givenness. However, there is also a great deal of agreement 
between Rorty and Lapoujade—following both thinkers, “we may equally well say that 
communities are multiple, according to the signs with which they are in agreement” 
(Lapoujade, 2019: 71). 
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Notes 
1 For Deleuze, memory is the whole past—that is, the ground; the present is thus the foundation because it 
is the most contracted point of the Bergsonian cone of the whole past. More specifically, because the past 
is continuous with the present, the present is only the most contracted point of the past for Deleuze. 
Nonetheless, despite these three syntheses in Difference and Repetition do break with the Kantian 
transcendental syntheses, they also coincide with the tripartite Kantian framework, where Kant’s intuition, 
imagination, and understanding correspond to Deleuze’s sentiendum (or the being of the sensible), 
memorandum (recollection), and cogitandum (or noeteon, the Essence that is not yet intelligible). 
2 Note that, with Deleuze’s machine ontology, the disjunctive synthesis is not easily reducible to the first, 
second, or third synthesis in Deleuze’s synthesis of memory. 
3 At the beginning of Anti-Oedipus Deleuze and Guattari outline the machine ontology: "It is at work 
everywhere, functioning smoothly at times, at other times in fits and starts. It breathes, it heats, it eats. It 
shits and fucks. What a mistake to have ever said the id. Everywhere it is machines—real ones, not 
figurative ones: machines driving other machines, machines being driven by other machines, with all the 
necessary couplings and connections. An organ-machine is plugged into an energy-source-machine: the 
one produces a flow that the other interrupts" (Deleuze & Guattari, 1983 [1972]: 1). Accordingly, machines 
operate via fluxes (including energy, desiring energy, matter, money, and so on) by stopping, using, 
transforming, and releasing them. For example, Western society responds to the abstract machine of 
capitalism, which itself organises the work of all the other machine by transforming the fluxes of Capital. 
Capital is the Body without Organs upon which the concrete machines are attached/connected in order to 
transform and to create an economy from the flux of money. So, not only is there a distinction between 
fluxes and machines in the machine ontology but any machine and every machine operates specifically with 
respect to the way in which it uses a particular flux and releases a transformed flux to the (other) 
connected machines. 
4 Unlike empirical matter, for James “material” designates reality that can be simultaneously physical and 
mental. This means that nothing is purely mental or purely material but that, for James, everything is 
relationally composited of physical-mental “material”. Lapoujade calls this a new rendering of vague 
monism where monism is reconceived of no longer being a thinking of the All but of the interval, the in-
between, the intermediary relation that differentially stretches between mind and matter, “precisely where 
they are closely emerged, but on the basis of which they are distinguished as well, albeit only virtually” 
(Lapoujade, 2019: 13). 
5 Lapoujade defines two aspects of pragmatism: 
i) pragmatism as method of practical evaluation: examining ideas, concepts, and philosophies by way 
of function of practical consequences (how they make us act or think). 
ii) pragmatic method: "inseparable from a tool of construction (or a genetic theory of what is meant 
by truth, to use James’s turn of phrase)" (2019: 4), responding to the question of how to produce 
ideas for acting or thinking as a method of evaluation (choosing the most beneficial ideas for action 
or thought—e.g., in choosing between determinism and free will, the former ascribes less voluntary 
moral ill will in the political realm). Thus, Lapoujade remarks that "[p]ragmatism is not a philosophy 
but a method for choosing among philosophies" and is a tool for construction, helping us "[c]reate 
ideas that may be of use in acting or thinking" (4). 
6 One of the most interesting facets of Lamarre’s Afterward is the bricolage between Simondon and James. 
James's concern is the indefinite vis-à-vis the individual rather than the definite (or Hegelian dialectical 
procedures in which the real is the rational and the movement of reason is one of the sublation of 
unreason). In James's resistance to rationalism and absolute idealism, we see the description of the 
individual as a "plane of consistency or composition whose unity is virtual" (Lamarre, 2019: 89). That is, the 
rational, definite individual of individualism is a constriction of non-rational process of indefinite 
composition—the plane of composition is thus granted primacy. Thus, in giving priority to material flows, 
James establishes a transcendental field autonomous of psychology and autonomous of its forms (i.e., the 
hylomorphic schemata where, as in Aristotle, form has de facto superiority over matter) where the 
individual organism implies a unity of functions (not forms). The individual is a point of departure  for the 
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establishment of a transcendental field, as James tracks material flows as they are revealed through the 
experimental vantage of natural sciences, especially concerning evolution. We have a similar idea with 
Simondon; consider the model of crystallization which, for Simondon, allows him to establish a 
transcendental field for individuation without positing a substantialist division between different modes of 
existence, such as “physical” beings (e.g., crystal) and “living” beings (e.g., “plants”). For Simondon, there is 
an ontological difference between “physical” and “living” beings: the former is characterized by carrying its 
associated milieu with it. For instance, the “crystal stops growing when you remove it from its aqueous 
solution” while the “plant may stop growing if you do not water it, but it carries a good deal of water with it, 
which allows for greater regulation of the relation between its inner and external milieus. It even puts 
water into circulation with its ecology” (Lamarre in Lapoujade, 2019: 109). For Simondon, the transcendental 
movement of evolution is not teleological or dialectical but deals with structure and reorganized material 
flows along transindividual relations, recombining aspects. For James, as for Simondon, we can solely 
understand an individual (psyche, organism, or experience) if we look at it in its environment and vide an 
ecological disjunctive relation—not one of resemblance or representation but heterogeneous scales, where 
"the overall coordination of the living system—plant of psyche—might be said to coordinate by hanging 
together at the edges, which allows for an overall coordination" (Lamarre in Lapoujade: 116). 
7 Thus, Lapoujade remarks that nature functions exactly “like a postal network on which a telephone 
network is superposed, partially overlapping with it while nonetheless, establishing specific connections, 
including new unities" (Lapoujade, 2019: 40). 
8 Elaborating on the distinction between ambulatory and saltatory knowledge, James writes that: 
Difference, for example, is saltatory, jumping as it were immediately from one term to another, but 
‘distance’ in time or space is made out of intervening parts of experience through which we 
ambulate in succession…. Now the most general way of contrasting my view of knowledge with the 
popular view (which is also the view of most epistemologists) is to call my view ambulatory, and 
the other view saltatory; and the most general way of characterising the two views is by saying that 
my view describes knowing as it exists concretely, while the other view only describes its results 
abstractly taken. I fear that most of my recalcitrant readers fail to recognise that what is 
ambulatory in the concrete may be taken so abstractly as to appear saltatory. Distance, for 
example, is made abstract by emptying out whatever is particular in the concrete intervals—it is 
reduced thus to a sole ‘difference,’ a difference of ‘place,’ which is a logical or saltatory distinction, 
a so-called ‘pure relation.’ My own account of this relation is ambulatory through and through. I say 
that we know an object by means of an idea, towards the object under the impulse which the idea 
communicates. (James 1987 [1909]: 888-889). 
9 Just as there is no relation of resemblance or representation between putative external facts and the 
overall direction of a system, where internal variation is immanent, Lamarre makes the case that through 
James, as with Foucault, we can model a conception of the question of power that does not recoil into the 
domain of external determinants (dominance and dominants, i.e., natural sovereignty) but is posed in light 
of immanent variation—tracing coordinated heterogeneous flows and functions in the dynamic movement 
of a system allows for "something like subordination" (Lamarre in Lapoujade, 2019: 116). 
10 James gives the example of train robbers who can solely succeed, despite their scant number, by 
counting on one another, a relation of faith and belief that works across individuals of convention: “[w]hile 
the contract determines its content through a limitation of powers, the convention calls on the 
indeterminate to actualise itself through rules that are established along the way” (Lapoujade, 2019: 67). 
11 Such an epistemology established on a social basis and as a condition of semiological convention has, 
today, been taken up by Robert Brandom and his notion of “giving and asking for reasons” where belief is 
stabilised through a set of multiple conventions and we come into agreement about meanings despite the 
agreement is not, itself, explicitly established.  
